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29 
Assessing the Competitive Effects of 
Surcharging the Use of Payment 
Mechanisms 
Steven Semeraro1 
The Department of Justice’s theory of liability in its case attacking 
the non–discrimination provisions in American Express’s 
merchant contracts contends that point–of–sale competition on 
the price of making a purchase with a credit card is an instrument 
creating economic efficiency. That is, the economy would run 
more efficiently, and consumers would be better off, if merchants 
were free to charge variable prices for different types of credit 
cards. After all, charging different prices for using different types 
of payment mechanisms appears to be just another form of 
presumptively positive price competition. 
The Second Circuit rejected that conclusion, recognizing that in 
credit card markets competition already occurs at multiple points. 
American Express must compete to: 
• convince cardholders to apply for and use its cards; and 
• convince merchants to accept its cards. 
The question, the Second Circuit correctly recognized, is whether 
adding a third type of competition – for cardholders to use the 
                                                                                                         
1 Steven Semeraro is a professor of law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law and the 
author of numerous articles on the impact of surcharging credit card transactions on retail 
prices including The Antitrust Economics (and Law) of Surcharging Credit Card 
Transactions, 14 STAN. J. OF BUS. & FIN. 343 (2009) and The Reverse-Robin-Hood-Cross-
Subsidy Hypothesis: Do Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 
RUTGERS L. J. 419 (2009).  
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card when merchants pass through their card acceptance fees – 
would make American Express’s card network more efficient? 
By prohibiting merchants who accept American Express cards 
from discriminating against the brand, the card company imposed 
a unilateral vertical restraint. Such restraints are often deemed to 
be reasonable under the antitrust laws because they may 
“stimulate inter–brand competition.” This is because an upstream 
provider, like American Express, has little interest in reducing its 
downstream sales. It would only impose a vertical restraint if that 
restraint efficiently helped it to sell more products. Only when an 
upstream or downstream provider has market power enabling it 
to impose restraints that harm consumers by raising price or 
lowering quality does a vertical restraint violate the antitrust 
laws. 
The Department of Justice’s theory postulated that the non–
discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant 
agreements harmed consumers by effectively requiring merchants 
to increase their prices to cover higher credit card fees for all 
customers because merchants could not pass the cost of accepting 
American Express directly to American Express’s own customers. 
The Second Circuit acknowledged the potential for consumer 
harm would exist if American Express charged merchants supra–
competitive prices and pocketed the excess as rents. But the court 
held that the government failed to prove that rivalry on the price 
consumers pay to use a credit card at the point of sale would 
increase efficiency in credit card markets. As the Second Circuit 
explained, credit card markets are two–sided. In order to prove 
harm to consumer welfare in a two–sided market, an antitrust 
plaintiff needs to show that a restraint makes the overall system 
less efficient. That is, do consumers overall pay more for less 
because of the restraint. 
A card network like American Express must compete for both 
cardholders and merchants. One therefore cannot demonstrate 
that price increases on one side of the market are inefficient 
without examining how those prices impact competition on the 
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other side of the market. American Express argued that it used 
increased revenue from the merchant side to offer a better card 
product to its cardholders and compete more effectively with other 
card networks, like Visa, for cardholder loyalty. 
The Second Circuit did not definitively decide whether American 
Express’s non–discrimination provisions were pro– or 
anticompetitive. It simply concluded that two–sided market 
economics made the question more complex than the government 
plaintiffs acknowledged in trying the case. And based on the 
record evidence, the court couldn’t tell whether the non–
discrimination provisions made the market more or less efficient. 
Since the plaintiff bears the burden of proving harm to 
competition, i.e. a reduction in efficiency to the overall market, 
the government plaintiffs had failed to prove their case. 
Part I reviews the economics of two–sided markets and provides 
reasons to conclude that non–discrimination provisions in credit 
card markets are efficient. Part II explains that a market’s two–
sided nature does not guarantee that participants in that market 
will charge competitive prices. Card systems with market power 
could set merchant fees at supra–competitive levels, leaving the 
market less efficient. This Part then contrasts Visa’s and 
MasterCard’s fees in the 1990s and early 2000s–which were 
challenged by merchants in a class action–with American 
Express’s current fees. It concludes that the factors giving the 
merchants a plausible case against Visa and MasterCard do not 
support the government plaintiffs in their case against American 
Express. Part III addresses a systemic concern expressed in a 
recent New York Times editorial about how a decision in 
American Express’s favor might impact the future enforcement of 
antitrust claims against dominant firms. This Part concludes that 
those concerns are unfounded. The Sherman Act has two principle 
sections. Truly dominant firms would remain subject to scrutiny 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 1 vertical 
restraint cases already require proof of consumer harm no 
different from what the Second Circuit required in its decision 
favoring American Express. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his seminal law review article The Limits of Antitrust, Judge (then–
Professor) Frank Easterbrook argued that “[a] ‘competitive market’ is not 
necessarily the one with the most rivalry moment–to–moment . . . . Every 
market entails substantial cooperation over some domain in order to 
facilitate competition elsewhere.”2 “Antitrust aims at preserving 
competition as an instrument for creating economic efficiency . . . . 
[C]ompetition cannot be defined as the state of maximum rivalry, for that 
is a formula of disintegration.”3 
The Department of Justice’s theory of liability in its case attacking the 
non–discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant 
acceptance contracts illustrates how difficult Easterbrook’s insight can be 
to apply.4 Under the DOJ’s theory, which the Federal District Court 
accepted, point–of–sale competition on the price of making a purchase 
with a credit card is an instrument creating economic efficiency.5 That is, 
the economy would run more efficiently, and consumers would be better 
off, if merchants were free to charge variable prices for different types of 
                                                                                                         
2 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).  
3 Id. at 13.  
4 See generally United States v. American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 150 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015).  
5 The District Court held that the government had proven “American Express’s NDPs 
have caused actual anticompetitive effects on interbrand competition. By preventing 
merchants from steering additional charge volume to their least expensive network, for 
example, the NDPs short–circuit the ordinary price–setting mechanism in the network 
services market by removing the competitive ‘reward’ for networks offering merchants a 
lower price for acceptance services. The result is an absence of price competition 
among American Express and its rival networks.” American Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 
at 151.  
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credit cards.6 After all, charging different prices for using different types 
of payment mechanisms appears to be just another form of presumptively 
positive price competition.  
By contrast, the Second Circuit’s decision reversing the trial court 
questioned that conclusion.7 To be sure, the antitrust laws presume that 
price competition will produce efficient price levels.8 As Easterbrook 
recognized, though, one cannot simply take as given that forcing rivalry at 
every potential point where competition might occur will yield these 
positive results.9 And the Second Circuit recognized that in credit card 
markets, competition already occurs at multiple points.10 American 
Express must compete to: 
• convince cardholders to apply for and use its cards; and 
• convince merchants to accept its cards. 
The question, the Second Circuit correctly recognized, is whether 
adding a third type of competition—for cardholders to use the card when 
merchants pass through their card acceptance fees—would make 
American Express’s card network more efficient or would it be, in 
Easterbrook’s words, a “formula [for] disintegration” of the credit 
system?11 
By prohibiting merchants who accept American Express cards from 
discriminating against the brand, the card company imposed a unilateral 
vertical restraint.12 Such restraints are often deemed to be reasonable under 
the antitrust laws because they may “stimulate interbrand competition.”13 
This is because an upstream provider, like American Express, has little 
interest in reducing its downstream sales. It would only impose a vertical 
restraint if that restraint efficiently helped it to sell more products. Only 
when an upstream provider has market power enabling it to impose 
restraints that harm consumers by raising price or lowering quality does a 
vertical restraint violate the antitrust laws.14 
The Department of Justice’s theory postulated that the non–
discrimination provisions in American Express’s merchant agreements 
                                                                                                         
6 See id.  
7 See generally United States v. American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 204–06 (2nd Cir. 
2016).  
8 See National Soc. Of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 
(1978).  
9 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 6.  
10 See generally American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179.  
11 Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 13.  
12 See id. at 195.  
13 Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 878 (2007).  
14 Id. at 894 (“A manufacturer with market power . . . might use resale price 
maintenance to give retailers an incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or new 
entrants.”) 
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harmed consumers by effectively requiring merchants to increase their 
prices to cover higher credit card fees for all customers because merchants 
could not pass the cost of accepting American Express directly to 
American Express’s own customers.15 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that the potential for consumer 
harm would exist if American Express charged merchants supra–
competitive prices and pocketed the excess as rents, but the court held that 
the government failed to prove that rivalry on the price consumers paid to 
use a credit card at the point of sale would increase efficiency in credit 
card markets.16 As the Second Circuit explained, credit card markets are 
two–sided.17 In order to prove harm to consumer welfare in a two–sided 
market, an antitrust plaintiff needs to show that a restraint makes the 
overall system less efficient.18 In other words, would consumers overall 
pay more for less because of the restraint? 
A card network like American Express must compete for both 
cardholders and merchants. One, therefore, cannot demonstrate that price 
increases on one side of the market are inefficient without examining how 
those prices impact competition on the other side of the market. American 
Express argued that it used increased revenue from the merchant side to 
offer a better card product to its cardholders and compete more effectively 
with other card networks, like Visa, for cardholder loyalty.19 
The Second Circuit did not definitively decide whether American 
Express’s non–discrimination provisions were pro– or anticompetitive.20 
Based on the record evidence, the court couldn’t tell whether the non–
discrimination provisions made the market more or less efficient.21 It 
simply concluded that two–sided market economics made the question 
more complex than the government plaintiffs acknowledged in trying the 
case.22 Since the plaintiff bears the burden of proving harm to 
competition—i.e., a reduction in efficiency to the overall market—the 
government plaintiffs had failed to prove their case.23 
Part I reviews the economics of two–sided markets and provides 
reasons to conclude that non–discrimination provisions in credit card 
markets are efficient. Part II explains that a market’s two–sided nature 
does not guarantee that participants in that market will charge competitive 
                                                                                                         
15 See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 184.  
16 Id. at 204–06.  
17 Id. at 198.  
18 See id. at 193.  
19 See id. at 202–03.  
20 See id. at 205–06.  
21 See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 206.  
22 See id. at 206–07.  
23 See id. at 205–06. 
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prices. Card systems with market power could set merchant fees at supra–
competitive levels, leaving the market less efficient. This Part then 
contrasts Visa’s and MasterCard’s fees in the 1990s and early 2000s–
which were challenged by merchants in a class action–with American 
Express’s current fees. It concludes that the factors giving the merchants 
a plausible case against Visa and MasterCard do not support the 
government plaintiffs in their case against American Express. Part III 
addresses a systemic concern expressed in a recent New York Times 
editorial about how a decision in American Express’s favor might impact 
the future enforcement of antitrust claims against dominant firms.24 This 
Part concludes that those concerns are unfounded. The Sherman Act has 
two principle sections. Truly dominant firms would remain subject to 
scrutiny under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and Section 1 vertical 
restraint cases already require proof of consumer harm no different from 
what the Second Circuit required in its decision favoring American 
Express. 
I. THE ECONOMICS OF CREDIT CARD NETWORKS 
In setting prices, card systems face two distinct customer bases: 
cardholders and merchants. Within such a two–sided market, prices are 
efficiently set at the level necessary to recover the system’s marginal costs, 
but the efficient price for the cardholder and for the merchant may not 
equal the marginal cost of providing the services received by each. On the 
contrary, in a two–sided market customers that are less sensitive to price—
i.e., have lower demand elasticity— will pay more than the cost of serving 
them while the more price–sensitive customers will pay less than the cost 
of serving them.25 Assuming that merchant demand for card acceptance is 
less elastic than cardholder demand, efficient pricing will place more of 
the cost of the system on merchants than cardholders.26 If merchants pass 
the cost of card acceptance on to the cardholders, however, the efficient 
pricing structure would be disrupted. Pass–through pricing would undo the 
balance between the relative elasticities of demand between card users and 
merchants with respect to card use and would thus drive card usage down 
below the efficient level.27 
                                                                                                         
24 Lina M. Khan, “The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech Giants More Power,” 
N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018) (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/the-supreme-
court-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-power.html).  
25 SEMERARO, supra note 1, at 347.  
26 SEMERARO, supra note 25, at 353.  
27 See id. at 353–58.  
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A. Understanding Two–sided Markets 
Credit card markets are far from unique. There are many markets in 
which the use of the product or service by consumers on two different sides 
directly impacts the utility of the product or service to the consumers on 
the other side. Common examples of markets functioning this way include 
newspapers (readers and advertisers), dating services (men and women), 
and optical disc technology suppliers (disc pressers and player 
manufacturers).28 The more readers, men, and disc pressers use these 
products and services, the more valuable they will be to advertisers, 
women, and player manufacturers, and vice versa.29 
Although the connection between value and use across customer types 
in a two–sided network market is intuitively obvious, the implication of 
this economic effect for efficient pricing is rather opaque. In a typical one–
sided market, an efficient price—one that will lead to an optimal 
consumption level—will generally approximate the marginal cost of 
production plus the profit necessary to attract investment to the industry.30 
This pricing model is efficient because it maximizes short–run output 
consistently with the producer earning sufficient revenue to continue 
providing the product or service. 
In a two–sided market, the same principle applies, but efficient pricing 
must take account of both total cost and the relative elasticities of demand 
between the two customer sets.31 If the customers on each side of such a 
market were charged the marginal cost of serving just their side of the 
market, they could fail to internalize the impact of their decisions to the 
customer set on the other side.32 For example, a card–accepting merchant 
would fail to account for the benefits of card use to a customer who would 
make the same purchase with or without a card. 
                                                                                                         
28 For a detailed discussion of the economics of two–sided markets see generally David 
S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two–Sided 
Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667; David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of 
Multi–Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325 (2003).  
29  See generally EVANS & NOEL, supra note 28.  
30  Michael L. Katz, What Do We Know About Interchange Fees and What Does it Mean 
for Public Policy?: Commentary on Evans and Schmalensee, FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY 
127 (2005), https://www.kansascityfed.org/bXkVg/publicat/pscp/2005/katz.pdf.  
31  EVANS & NOEL, supra note 28, at 681. 
32  See KATZ, supra note 30, at 126–27; see generally Julian Wright, Optimal Card 
Payment Systems, (May 8, 2002) (manuscript at 8) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=278047); see generally Margaret E. Guerin–Calvert & Janusz A. 
Ordover, Merchant Benefits and Public Policy Towards Interchange: An Economic 
Assessment, 4 REV. NETWORK ECON. 384, 384–85 (2006) (explaining that “[t]he network 
externalities that link merchants who accept cards and card–holders who use them compel 
a price/fee structure that will likely entail deviations from the cost–causality principles that 
call for prices to be closely linked to the underlying costs of providing direct benefits to 
either side of the market.”).  
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Two–sided market economic theory predicts that if demand 
elasticities diverge to any significant degree between the customers on 
each side of the market, output under a pricing scheme that covered 
marginal–cost separately on each side of the market would be inefficiently 
low. To obtain an efficient output level, a producer must charge the 
customer set that is more sensitive to price less than marginal cost of 
serving that customer (effectively enabling those consumers to internalize 
the benefits to both sides of the market).33 
The classic example is the daily newspaper.34 Readers have many 
sources of news, including television, magazines, and the internet. Reader 
demand for newspapers is thus likely to be quite elastic, leading them to 
turn away from the morning paper if the subscription prices were to 
approach the marginal cost of producing and delivering it.35 By contrast, 
advertisers perceive significant benefits in print advertising (so long as 
readership is high), and are thus willing to pay substantially above the 
newspapers’ marginal cost of printing and providing associated services 
to the advertiser because of the value of exposure through a high 
circulation paper.36 As a result, readers pay significantly below marginal 
cost and advertisers pay substantially more.37 Competition between 
newspapers and other media for advertising space still drives pricing, but 
not to marginal cost plus normal profit for each customer set. This pricing 
pattern efficiently optimizes newspaper circulation, satisfying both the 
advertisers’ need for broad exposure and the readers’ need for 
information.38 
Assuming that newspapers have little market power, both advertisers 
and readers would be worse off if pricing were forced into line with 
marginal cost on each side of the market. If advertising fees were to drop 
and reader fees proportionally increased, prices would move toward 
marginal cost on each side of the market. Because reader demand is more 
elastic, however, readership would drop more than advertising would 
increase, and advertising rates would thus fall. As a result, the paper would 
(1) earn lower overall revenue; (2) be less valuable to advertisers because 
readership would fall; and (3) be less valuable to readers because the paper 
would have less revenue for newsgathering. 
                                                                                                         
33  KATZ, supra note 30, at 127; see Jean–Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation 
Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 
549, 566 (2002); see Wright, supra note 32, at 17.  
34  For a formal treatment of this example see Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lener, Kevin 
M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache, Competition in Two–Sided Markets: The Antitrust 
Economics of Payment Card Interchange, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 571, 577–79 (2006).  
35 Id. at 579.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 577. 
38 See id. at 579.  
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B. Applying Two–sided Market Theory to Card Markets 
To the extent that the elasticity of demand varies significantly between 
merchants and cardholders, card systems resemble newspapers.39 
Merchants, like print advertisers, have been willing to pay significantly 
above the marginal cost of the credit card acceptance services presumably 
because of the value card acceptance creates for a merchant.40 
Cardholders, like newspaper readers, would be reluctant to pay the 
marginal cost of providing credit cards and associated services.41 Thus, 
two–sided market theory predicts that efficient credit card pricing would 
resemble the existing marketplace—a greater share of the total costs of the 
payment system are placed on merchants.42 
To be sure, relative elasticities across customer groups are difficult to 
measure. Long standing practice in credit card markets, however, appears 
to confirm that cardholder demand is considerably more elastic than 
merchant demand and thus merchants pay more than the marginal cost of 
serving them and cardholders pay less.43 Since the beginning, card systems 
have adopted cost allocation systems that empower cardholders to use 
cards without taking account of the per transaction costs that arise as a 
result of their decision.44 Every existing credit card system, until recently, 
prohibited merchants from passing on the price that they pay for card 
acceptance to cardholders, and each system adopted that pricing policy 
well before it had market power.45 By uniformly adopting a pricing policy 
in a competitive market that shifts revenue from the merchant side to the 
                                                                                                         
39 Id. at 580.  
40 See id. at 585.  
41 See id. at 585–88.  
42 Id. at 584; see also Richard Schmalensee, Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, 50 
J. OF INDUS. ECON. 103, 115 (2002) (explaining that “increasing total output . . . by 
subsidizing price cuts where demand elasticity is high . . . increases the size of the pie for 
the system as a whole.”). 
43  In ATM and PIN debit card markets, by contrast, interchange fees have in some cases 
flowed away from cardholders to those who accept debit cards as a means to access cash.  
44 See Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust 
Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 967, 988 (2007).  
45  See id. at 988 (explaining that “[t]he direction of interchange fee payments . . . 
appears to be consistent with an efficient and competitive market.”); see also KATZ, supra 
note 30, at 123 (virtually all debit card systems also have interchange fees flowing from 
merchants to issuers). Recently, Visa and MasterCard agreed as part of a settlement 
agreement to permit merchants to surcharge credit card transactions. That agreement was 
rejected by the courts. And even if it remained in place, it was designed to compel 
merchants to inflict more harm on American Express than they would on Visa and 
MasterCard.  
2018] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 39 

cardholder side, the card systems practice accords with what two–sided 
market theory would predict.46 
The efficiency of this form of elasticity–based pricing garners further 
support by the growth in both merchant acceptance and card use over 
time.47 If a pricing policy placing a greater burden on the merchant side 
were inefficient, one would expect to see merchants rejecting credit cards. 
But that has not happened. Card acceptance has spread to more and more 
segments of the economy. Although many card–accepting merchants do 
not accept American Express cards, the number of merchants who do has 
been increasing.48 The existing system of cost allocation thus appears to 
be efficient because forcing cardholders to cover costs now paid by 
merchants would be likely to lead to an inefficient under–use of cards.49 
To understand the anticompetitive effect of allowing merchants to 
pass the cost of card acceptance on to consumers, consider a chess club 
that when charging uniform dues to all players has a membership that is 
(1) disproportionately low–skill and (2) lower in number than the club 
could efficiently accommodate. The club organizers therefore decide to 
offer free admission to high–skilled players, while increasing the dues 
charged to low–skilled club members. This differential pricing: 
(1) attracts more high–skilled players; 
(2) makes the club more desirable for low–skilled players who thus 
attend more often; and 
(3) increases membership and utilization of club facilities. 
                                                                                                         
46  See Steven Semeraro, The Efficiency and Fairness of Enforced Sharing: An 
Examination of the Essence of Antitrust, 52 U. KAN. L. Rev. 57, 97–98 (2003) (discussing 
generally how practices undertaken by firms in competitive markets are presumptively 
efficient).  
47  Judge Easterbrook has famously explained that practices increasing output over time 
are likely to be efficient. See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 979 (1986); see also EASTERBROOK, supra note 2, at 30–34.  
48 Robert Harrow, More Consumers and Merchants Turning To American Express 
Credit Cards, https://www.valuepenguin.com/2017/07/more-consumers-and-merchants-
turning-american-express-credit-cards (updated Apr. 5, 2018).  
49  KATZ, supra note 30, at 126 (explaining that surcharging can undo the effects of 
interchange fees). Alan Frankel has questioned this justification for the no–surcharge rule, 
arguing that if merchants want to encourage additional card use, they could easily do so 
themselves through point–of–sale discounts and other incentives. Alan S. Frankel & Allan 
L. Shampine, The Economic Effects of Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L. J. 627, 647 
(2006). But merchants face conflicting incentives. The benefits that they receive from 
credit cards are often infra–marginal, such as an overall increase in spending levels not 
directly tied to individual transaction purchase decisions. Merchants benefit at the margin 
only when the cardholder would not make the purchase without the card. If the customer 
would make the purchase in all events, a merchant may experience a marginal benefit from 
the use of another means of payment, but an infra–marginal loss if cardholders stopped 
carrying credit cards altogether. See Adam Levitin, Priceless? The Competitive Costs of 
Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1348–49, 1353 (2008). 
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By attracting more high–skilled players through differential pricing, 
the club functions more efficiently and thus all of its members benefit. To 
be sure, low–skilled players bear a greater percentage of the cost of 
operating the club than high–skilled players, but the club provides more 
value to them—i.e., the chance to play against and learn from higher–
skilled players. If this pricing strategy were not efficient, low–skilled 
players would leave the club rather than pay the higher dues. 
The chess club with differential pricing corresponds to the existing 
credit card market in which merchants, like low–skilled players in the 
hypothetical, pay a higher percentage of the costs of the payment system 
than necessary to recover the marginal cost of serving them. The DOJ’s 
theory of the case presumes that the chess club’s pricing policy would be 
inefficient because high–skilled players were not covering the club’s full 
cost of serving them and revenues generated by low–skilled players, the 
analogy continues, inefficiently subsidized the high–skilled players. 
By choosing to frequent the club in greater numbers, however, the 
low–skilled players demonstrated that they preferred the club with 
differential pricing to the less expensive club with a single price. 
Merchants’ willingness to accept credit cards in ever increasing numbers 
within the card systems’ existing pricing models communicates the same 
message. 
Discrimination among payment systems in the card market would 
disrupt this presumptively efficient pricing mechanism by shifting some 
costs onto cardholders. A similar disruption might occur in the chess club 
if the meeting organizers surcharged high–skilled players by, for example, 
charging them more for refreshments at club meetings than the low–skilled 
players must pay, undoing the benefit of the differential pricing. High–
skilled players enticed to join the club by the no–dues policy would soon 
realize that they were paying more for refreshments. The meeting 
organizer, like a merchant surcharging card transactions, would negate the 
benefit of the no–dues policy. The likely effect would be that high–skilled 
players would quit, and the club would thus end up back where it started: 
with an inefficiently low number of members all paying the same entry 
fee. 
Just as high–skilled chess players would quit the club if short–sighted 
meeting organizers surcharged their refreshments, cardholders would 
reduce their use of cards if merchants passed on acceptance fees by 
charging their customers a per transaction fee to use a particular means of 
payment. 
2018] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 41 
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II. SUPRA–COMPETITIVE CREDIT CARD PRICING 
Two–sided market economics provide a reason why placing a greater 
share of a card network’s costs on the merchant side is likely to be 
efficient. But it does not insulate card networks from violating the antitrust 
laws by charging merchants fees at a level above what efficient two–sided 
market pricing would require. When merchants first sued Visa and 
MasterCard—but tellingly not American Express—attacking the 
networks’ merchant fees, I presented a theory explaining why the 
merchants had a strong case that the Visa and MasterCard fees—though 
lower than American Express’s fees—might nonetheless by inefficiently 
high.50 Two points were critical to that theory. 
First, merchants had a legitimate argument that the banks controlling 
Visa and MasterCard exercised sufficient market power to block 
merchants from dropping either brand because too many consumers rely 
exclusively on their cards and thus, in the United States, virtually all card–
accepting merchants accept Visa and MasterCard.51 By contrast, “roughly 
one–third of credit card–accepting merchants in the United States” do not 
accept American Express cards.52 
Second, there appeared to be no plausible justification for the 
increases in merchant fees that proceeded the filing of that class action. 
The banks controlling Visa and MasterCard were growing revenues 
through the revolving credit business and improved technology was 
lowering the costs of fraud risk and other aspects of merchant 
acceptance.53 Visa and MasterCard never offered a plausible explanation 
for their fee increases during the relevant period before the complaint was 
filed.54 Curiously, the Department of Justice never joined the merchant 
class action against Visa and MasterCard. 
In this case, American Express did offer a plausible explanation for its 
increasing merchant fees.55 It’s strategy to compete for cardholders—most 
of whom did not carry revolving credit balances—by offering an elite 
package of cardholder rewards and marketing the superiority of its reward 
program to potential cardholders.56 This competitive strategy explained 
the network’s merchant pricing policies to a far greater extent than Visa 
and MasterCard explained their fee increases in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
The following sections set out two reasons that the DOJ might have 
concluded that merchant discrimination would produce more efficient card 
                                                                                                         
50 SEMERARO, supra note 44, at 989–91.  
51 Id. 
52 American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 203.  
53 See SEMERARO, supra note 44, at 992–96.  
54 Id.  
55 See American Express Co., 838 F.3d at 202–03.  
56 Id.  
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pricing: (1) Visa and MasterCard in litigation settlements had agreed to 
permit surcharging; and (2) prohibiting discrimination inefficiently 
compelled merchants to impose American Express’s high cost on all of its 
consumers. It finds both theories unavailing. 
A. Visa and MasterCard Settlements 
Perhaps the Antitrust Division believed that by agreeing to permit 
discrimination among payment schemes through surcharging, Visa and 
MasterCard had acknowledged that prohibiting discrimination was not 
necessary to ensure efficient card pricing. But that settlement was 
configured specifically to ensure that any surcharging would necessarily 
benefit Visa and MasterCard when compared to American Express.57 The 
settlement prohibited merchants from surcharging a lower–priced card 
without also surcharging a higher priced one, even if the merchant 
perceived more value from the higher priced card.58 Given state laws 
prohibiting surcharging, and American Express’s continuous enforcement 
of its non–discrimination restraint,59 Visa and MasterCard knew that 
significant surcharging was extremely unlikely to occur and, if it did, it 
would only hurt American Express more than it would hurt them. The Visa 
and MasterCard settlement agreements thus provide little confidence that 
discrimination would make card fees more efficient. 
B. Inefficient Cost–Shifting Among Consumers 
The DOJ surely recognizes that permitting discrimination would 
reduce the welfare of American Express cardholders by denying the card 
network the ability to obtain the revenue it needs from merchants to 
support the rewards it provides to cardholders. The Division must, 
therefore, believe that this loss would be outweighed by the gains of other 
consumers who presumably pay higher prices because of American 
Express’s higher cardholder fees, but who do not receive any rewards. But 
it is unclear why this would be the case. The Division appears to assume 
implausibly that merchants who accept American Express cards receive 
no benefits from doing so and simply pass on the cost of card acceptance 
                                                                                                         
57 See generally Steven Semeraro, Settlement without Consent: Assessing The Credit 
Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 186, 208–11 (2015).  
58 See generally id. (citing In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Discount 
Antitrust Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 05–MD–1720) (these 
paragraphs permitting surcharging: ¶ 41 (brand level surcharging, but ¶¶ 41–45 prohibiting 
surcharging one brand if a more expensive card were not surcharged))).  
59 See id. at 216–18. These provisions would also sunset in 2021, freeing the networks 
to again prohibit surcharging or other forms of discrimination; see also id. at 242.  
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to their consumers on a dollar–for–dollar basis.60 But, if it were the case 
that merchants obtained no benefits from accepting American Express 
cards, they would simply not accept the card, joining the one–third of 
card–accepting merchants who do not accept American Express cards 
now. The reason that merchants accept American Express cards thus must 
be because they obtain the benefit of increased sales as a result of 
accepting the card. 
If accepting American Express cards enables a merchant to increase 
sales, then one cannot presume that the merchant’s prices will increase on 
a dollar–for–dollar basis to cover the fees it pays to American Express.61 
By increasing its sales, a merchant can spread its fixed costs over a larger 
total sales volume, potentially enabling it to lower its prices compared to 
what they would be if it did not accept American Express cards at all.62 
Whether the increase in sales that accepting a card brand brings to a 
merchant increases or decreases its ultimate prices is a particularly 
difficult empirical question, but one cannot simply assume that prices will 
increase, much less on a dollar–for–dollar basis. 
Moreover, discrimination schemes are not costless to implement, and 
they would thus add to a merchant’s costs. Whether the merchant would 
save more on reduced card acceptance fees than the cost of a 
discrimination program is again an empirical question. That merchants 
have refused to implement cash discounting schemes, despite the right to 
do so, for decades suggests that the savings in reduced card fees would not 
outweigh the cost of a discrimination scheme. 
In the end, it is entirely possible that permitting merchant 
discrimination would simply enable merchants with market power to 
extract even more rents from their customers by discouraging consumers 
who would make purchases with or without cards to refrain from using 
them or paying higher prices. But there is no reason to presume that this 
practice will lead a merchant with market power to lower its prices to other 
customers. 
And even if American Express’s merchant fees are inefficiently high, 
merchants that discriminated against American Express would be 
extremely unlikely to calculate a surcharge or other form of discrimination 
at precisely the level needed to strip a card network of its inefficient 
overcharge. This is true because merchants generally would not have 
access to knowledge about the relative cross–elasticities between 
cardholders and merchants on which efficient card network pricing 
                                                                                                         
60 See Steven Semeraro, The Reverse–Robin–Hood–Cross–Subsidy Hypothesis: Do 
Credit Card Systems Tax the Poor and Reward the Rich?, 40 RUTGERS L. J. 419, 429–33 
(2009).  
61 See id.  
62 See id. 
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depends, and even if merchants had perfect knowledge, they wouldn’t 
impose the right surcharge because they do not have the right incentives. 
Merchants care only about whether a customer makes a purchase. Any 
benefit that accrued to a card–using customer from the use of the card in 
situations where the customer would make the purchase even without the 
card would be ignored by the merchant. 
Ultimately, merchants would likely divide into roughly two camps. 
The first group—merchants in reasonably competitive markets—would 
likely find the costs of discriminating prohibitive.63 The second group—
merchants with substantial market power—might impose a surcharge or 
other form of discrimination, but these merchants could potentially retain 
a significant portion of the card fee savings as profit rather than pass it on 
to their customers.64 This second group of merchants may even use the 
surcharging power to exact greater profits from those consumers who must 
use a credit card for a particular transaction.65 
III. SYSTEMIC ANTITRUST CONCERNS 
In a recent op–ed in the New York Times, Lina M. Khan, the director 
of legal policy at Open Markets Institute and a visiting fellow at Yale Law 
School, argued that a holding in favor of American Express “would create 
de facto antitrust immunity for the most powerful companies in the 
economy,” such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon.66 This fear is 
misplaced for two reasons. 
First, the companies she identified are true dominant firms in their 
industries. As she correctly recognizes, “antitrust scrutiny of their conduct 
[is] especially important.”67 These firms, however, would be subject to that 
scrutiny under Section 2 of the Sherman Act as Microsoft was in the U.S.68 
and Google has been under the European Union equivalent.69 The issue 
here is not the law, but the fortitude of U.S. enforcement authorities to 
bring monopolization cases. 
                                                                                                         
63 See Zhu Wang, Market Structure and Credit Card Pricing: What Drives 
Interchange?, 28 INT’L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 86, 95 (2010) (concluding that the no–surcharge 
rule “does not play a role” with respect to merchants in competitive markets).  
64 See WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 8 (explaining that “[w]hen surcharging is allowed, 
merchants with monopoly power will exploit their power by setting a price to extract 
surplus from inframarginal cardholders”).  
65 See Semeraro, supra note 1, at 365.  
66 KHAN, supra note 24.  
67 Id.  
68 See generally United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
69 Mark Scott, Google Fined Record $2.7 Billion in E.U. Antitrust Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jun. 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/eu-google-fine.html.  
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American Express, by contrast, is not similarly dominant. It has less 
than a thirty percent market share, smaller than Visa and on a par with 
MasterCard, both of which have the entire banking industry behind them 
and significantly larger merchant networks.70 Although Khan claims that 
“[t]he credit card industry is a classic case of oligopoly,”71 it is hard to find 
evidence of that. In an oligopoly, one would expect stable pricing and a 
lack of innovative competitive efforts. The card networks, however, 
compete fiercely for cardholders and have maintained a differing range of 
merchant fees. Visa and MasterCard have made great strides eating into 
American Express’s strength at the high end of the market while American 
Express has competed to capture more middle–class card holders. To be 
sure, all of the networks charge merchants more than the cost of providing 
service to them, but that is the expected result of the nature of efficient 
pricing given market conditions, not evidence of oligopoly behavior. To 
claim that credit card networks are anticompetitive because they charge 
merchants a lot and cardholders very little would be the equivalent of 
claiming that newspapers are anticompetitive because they charge 
advertisers a lot and readers very little. 
Second, the concern that Khan expresses about the difficulty of 
proving a vertical restraint case is—for better or worse—already part and 
parcel of antitrust law. If American Express wins this case, she argues, 
tech “platforms will be able to engage in anticompetitive activity with one 
set of users, so long as they can plausibly claim that harmful conduct 
enabled them to benefit another group.”72 She offers as an example that 
Uber could prohibit its drivers from also serving rivals like Lyft and 
suppress the drivers’ income.73 “Under the current approach,” she argues 
“these exclusive agreements would likely violate antitrust law. But under 
the Second Circuit’s analysis, the case would go nowhere unless plaintiffs 
could show that this practice also harmed riders.”74 
That’s simply not an accurate description of either current law or the 
law that would exist if the Supreme Court upholds the Second Circuit. 
Current law governing vertical restraints under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act requires proof that the defendant has the ability to harm consumers 
and that the restraint in question could plausibly have that effect.75 Under 
current law, a court considering Uber’s exclusivity policy would ask why 
Uber would impose such a restraint on its own drivers. An obvious reason 
would be that exclusive Uber drivers would accept calls from riders more 
                                                                                                         
70 United States v. Visa, U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 235, 240 (2d Cir. 2003).  
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quickly, making Uber a more effective competitor against other taxi 
services and increasing its output, which would benefit both Uber and its 
drivers as well as their customers. 
No similarly obvious anticompetitive story exists. Assuming Uber has 
market power—which it probably does not in any market including Lyft—
it could benefit either by driving down the fee it pays drivers or driving up 
the fee it receives from riders, but the proposed exclusivity restraint would 
do neither. By limiting a driver’s sources of income, Uber would need to 
pay that driver more to convince her to accept the exclusive deal. Riders 
would be hurt as prices went up, but not in a way that would benefit Uber 
because it would be using the price increase to pay drivers more. 
A plausible antitrust theory attacking Uber’s hypothetical exclusivity 
policy would exist under current law if, by imposing exclusivity 
requirements on its drivers, Uber could deny Lyft and other competitors 
adequate access to drivers. But by limiting the ability of its competitors to 
meet consumer demand, Uber could raise its prices to riders, violating the 
antitrust laws. Contrary to Khan’s assertion, current law would thus 
require proof that the restraint on drivers hurt riders in order for it to violate 
the antitrust laws. 
And nothing would change were American Express to win its case. 
The issue in a Rule of Reason case is whether a restraint is likely to 
increase output in the market and thus better serve consumer demand, or 
lower output and, therefore, drive up prices.76 In a two–sided market, a 
price increase on one side of the market may increase output across the 
entire system and that appears to have been the effect of American 
Express’s non–discrimination provision.77 Credit card use has increased, 
by definition benefiting the consumers who use credit cards. 
To prove an anticompetitive effect, a plaintiff would need to show off–
setting consumer harm either through a reduction in the defendant’s own 
output or through a reduction in market output because the restraint 
hinders the ability of competitors in that market.78 In a case against 
Google, for example, the plaintiff would be required to show either a 
reduction in ads or searches on Google, or a hindering of competitive 
search engines’ ability to compete with Google because of the restraint. 
The Second Circuit properly recognized that the government plaintiffs had 
failed to articulate a plausible story for how American Express’s non–
discrimination provisions could decrease its own output or the output of 
the broader market.79 
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CONCLUSION 
The economics of two–sided markets do rule out the possibility of 
anticompetitive harm, but the Second Circuit correctly concluded that the 
government plaintiffs failed to prove harm in this case. The merchant class 
may have a stronger case against Visa and MasterCard in that on–going 
litigation if it ever gets to trial.  
